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Abstract 
Modern conversations between the natural sciences and theology on the human soul have not 
so far engaged extensively with the debates of the early church on the matter. This article 
considers the relevance of the Apollinarian controversy (the fourth century Christological 
contention of whether or not Jesus has a human soul/mind), and suggests that this introduces 
important considerations for the science-theology conversations.  
 
The contemporary neurosciences and cognitive science tend to operate within a monistic 
paradigm (often referred to as ‘physicalism’ in the science and theology field). This position 
understands all human mental activity entirely in biological/naturalistic terms, and is thereby 
more or less reductionist compared with the Cartesian paradigm of recent centuries, which 
saw the mind/soul in terms of a thinking dimension to reality distinct from the physical. And 
while there is ongoing uncertainty in the new scientific paradigm about the degree to which 
human consciousness can be reduced entirely to biology (and thereby eventually to physics), 
physicalism is often cited as making traditional religious belief in the soul obsolete, or at least 
modifying it significantly (as in the emergentist ‘non-reductive physicalism’ position held by 
a number of practitioners in the science and theology field). The Apollinarian question of 
whether Jesus has a soul therefore re-appears. This is not, however, a new form of 
Apollinarianism, since, if Jesus does not have a dualistic soul in the physicalist paradigm, 
then neither does anyone else. Nevertheless, in the course of examining some of the crucial 
arguments at the heart of the Apollinarian controversy, I will suggest that the modern 
discussion on the soul/mind has thus far been too simplistic in theological terms. The decisive 
rebuttals of Apollinarius by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, often characterised 
as a re-assertion of the importance of the human soul, actually reveal soteriological subtleties 
concerning the status and existence of the soul which the modern debate has overlooked.  
 
This article will present the relevant fourth century views on the human mind/soul critically, 
suggesting that, far from being uncompromisingly dualist, they possess important points of 
contact with the modern non-reductive physicalist position. I will consequently argue that the 
modern debate needs to be expanded to incorporate three theological features that were 
judged to be of crucial important in the fourth century: (1) the anthropological location and 
role of human sin; (2) the soul as causal joint; and (3) the Cappadocian theology of 
deification. 
 
Keywords: Theological anthropology, soul, mind, non-reductive physicalism, Apollinarian 
controversy, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa 
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1. Introduction 
 
Belief in the dualistic soul, as an immaterial entity which encapsulates a person’s living 
identity and carries on into the afterlife, has been an important component of Western 
Christian anthropologies for many centuries. Recent decades have seen something of a 
paradigm shift, however, on account of the emerging monistic consensus in neuroscientific 
research and in cognitive science, based on the conviction that all mental and spiritual 
capacities are located in neural activity.1 The inevitable effect has been to cast doubt on the 
existence of the immaterial soul. And although some philosophers and theologians have 
defended dualistic accounts, prominent others have responded positively to the monistic 
paradigm by putting forward anthropologies which emphasise the essential physical unity of 
the human person, and which see mental and spiritual capacities (including the soul) as 
entirely emergent therefrom. A particularly influential example of the latter is ‘non-reductive 
physicalism’, set out by the essays in Warren Brown et al.’s well-known collection of 1998, 
Whatever Happened to the Soul? Less a detailed engagement with the specifics of the 
science, and more an account of the paradigm shift away from Cartesian substance dualism 
towards monism, this contemporary move can be seen as a rediscovery of the more holistic 
anthropology of ancient Hebrew thought, an anthropology which had disappeared from view 
in medieval Western Christianity through the influence of Greek dualistic tendencies. In this 
article, I will argue that this perceived historical trajectory is over-simplified, and ignores key 
Christological debates of the early church, where these very problems concerning the soul 
were discussed extensively. The fourth century CE is important in this, especially the 
theological crisis in the Greek-speaking East precipitated by Apollinarius of Laodicea’s 
teaching that Christ does not have a rational human mind/soul (νοῦς). This crisis led to a 
careful consideration of the merits of monist, dualist, and trichotomist anthropologies, 
especially by the two Cappadocian theologians, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, 
revealing soteriological points that have not yet been considered in depth in the contemporary 
soul debate. This article will present the relevant fourth century views critically, suggesting 
that they are compatible with the modern physicalist position on the soul, but that this 
position needs to be expanded to incorporate three theological features: (1) the place of sin; 
(2) the soul as causal joint (or ‘dividing wall’); and (3) the Cappadocian theology of 
θέωσις/ἐπέκτασις.  
 
2. The historical trajectory 
 
Any contemporary discussion of the soul must reckon with a formidable background in the 
history of thought. Modern studies often describe this history in terms of a trajectory through 
key thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition, beginning at Plato and Aristotle, 
proceeding quickly through Augustine and Aquinas, and then pausing at Descartes as the 
most important forebear of contemporary substance dualism.2 This trajectory construes the 
soul debate in terms of evolving views on substance and form, not least because the Cartesian 
question (of whether the reality of the thinking world is to be seen as wholly distinct from the 
reality of the material world) tends to revolve on whether the soul should be seen as a 
separate substance from the material world, or as a form within (or tied to) that world 
                                                 
1 It is not that such work altogether disproves soul-body (or mind-body) dualism, but rather that, as Nancey 
Murphy contends, the current monistic approach should be regarded as the hard core of a Lakatosian ‘research 
program’, which has been far more productive in scientific terms than has the contending hard core of mind-
body dualism (Murphy, 2002: 202-203). 
2 E.g. Murphy (2006: 11-16, 45-47), Goetz and Taliaferro (2011: 6-104). 
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(hylomorphism). Thus, more dualistic approaches are contrasted with more monistic, Plato 
with Aristotle, and Augustine with Aquinas. 
 
The biblical world, knowing little or nothing of Greek philosophical categories, represents 
something of an outlier in this trajectory, but the Bible can be incorporated as a representative 
of the hard monistic end of the spectrum,3 since the ancient Semitic view of the human 
person maintained an essential physical unity.4 Thus, talk of the ‘soul’ in the biblical context 
is a way of summing up this unity as imbued with God-breathed life (Genesis 2:7). Likewise, 
whatever Paul meant by his term ‘spiritual body’ when discussing the afterlife (1 Corinthians 
15:44), he was almost certainly thinking in terms of the resurrection of a material body rather 
than the post-mortem existence of a disembodied soul. 
 
Significantly, the idea that the soul is detachable – an intangible entity in its own right which 
contains a person’s true identity beyond their bodily death – appears clearly in early 
Christianity in the thought of theologians such as Origen and Augustine, who were heavily-
influenced by their Hellenistic context.5 This importation of the immortal and dualistic soul 
into Christianity is of dubious merit, according to some. Pannenberg, for instance, is 
particularly negative, explaining how, despite the best efforts of early theologians to maintain 
a holistic view, yet the Hellenistic body-soul duality ‘invaded Christian anthropology’ in the 
second century CE.6 The supposition is that much could be gained by re-discovering the 
earlier Christian view. And Nancey Murphy wonders wistfully what might have happened if 
the importation of dualism had been resisted: Christianity would almost certainly have 
retained a ‘broader, richer’ emphasis on the this-worldly teachings of Jesus rather than on 
metaphysical speculations.7  
 
I myself would tend to agree: there is something to be said for the contemporary re-assertion 
of monistic anthropologies over the long-prevalent dualistic views if the former allow for a 
renewed appreciation of biblical texts, and for a constructive engagement of theology with 
modern neuroscience, which is, after all, resolutely monistic in its view of human mental 
processes.8 However, insofar as this contemporary theological re-assertion of anthropological 
monism is served by an historical trajectory which sees the varying views on substance and 
form as the only issues of note, it has meant that other theological questions concerning the 
soul have received little or no attention. That there are indeed such other questions becomes 
clear when the ‘invasion’ of the Hellenistic soul in the early church is examined, especially 
around the controversial teachings of Apollinarius, who became bishop of Laodicea around 
360 CE. Not only does this controversy demonstrate that belief in the soul was complex and 
varied in the early church, but it also suggests that issues of substance and form are of rather 
secondary theological importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 E.g. Green (1998: 172-3); Goetz and Taliaferro (2011: 30). 
4 Murphy (1998: 19-24). 
5 Murphy (1998: 4). 
6 Pannenberg (1984: 182). 
7 Murphy (2006: 27-8). 
8 Although ‘physicalist’ tends to be the adjective of choice over ‘monistic’. 
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3. The Apollinarian Christ 
 
Apollinarius formulated his infamous Christology as an attempt to underscore the full 
divinity of the Son of God against the Arians,9 and to clinch the argument by explaining how 
the divine Son could co-exist with the human Jesus to make the one Christ.10 Crucially, 
Apollinarius achieved this holistic anthropology by – rather as in the contemporary re-
assertion of anthropological monism – denying the soul. As Apollinarius saw it, the 
incarnation is literally the enfleshment of the divine Logos.11 Since Stoic thought connected 
the Logos with the universal animating wisdom, and biblical thought (John 1:1-18) identified 
the Logos with the divine itself, it is easy to see the logic by which Apollinarius explained the 
Logos as the mind of Christ, empowering the human body of Jesus in place of the usual 
rational human soul.  
 
Two particular concerns appear to stand behind Apollinarius’ denial of a human soul for 
Jesus. First, there is the need to understand Christ in unified terms, to be able to affirm 
unambiguously that Christ the Saviour, God and human, is one, and is therefore able to unite 
humans with God.12 Second, is the problem of sin: Apollinarius was certain that Christ cannot 
save humankind if Christ is in possession of a human mind or soul, because he (Christ) would 
then be influenced by sin. Only a Christ who does not possess a fallible human soul or mind 
has the power to save, as Apollinarius says: 
 
The Word did not become flesh by taking on a human mind, a mind that is changeable 
and subject to filthy thoughts, but by being a divine unchangeable heavenly mind.13 
 
And in one of the fragments of his Apodeixis: 
 
If together with God, who is intellect (νοῦς), there was also a human intellect 
(ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς) in Christ, then the work of the incarnation is not accomplished in 
him.14  
 
According to Apollinarius then, Christ needs the divine mind in order to be the Saviour 
because otherwise he would not be immune from sin.  
 
It is difficult to pin down Apollinarius’ argument with confidence though, not least because 
of the fragmentary form in which his texts have come down to us. In some of his fragments 
he seems to operate with a basic dichotomist anthropology: the human person is flesh (σάρξ) 
and spirit (πνεῦμα), where the Logos takes the place of spirit in Christ (i.e. spirit is all that is 
non-material in the human, including soul, mind and spirit); while in other writings 
Apollinarius works with a trichotomist anthropology: body (σῶμα), animal soul (ψυχή) and 
                                                 
9 See, for example Spoerl (1993), although she later suggests that Apollinarius had other non-Arian antagonists 
in his sights, such as Marcellus of Ancyra (Spoerl, 1994). 
10 Ironically, Apollinarius’ solution was really to state in clearer terms the logic which Athanasius and others 
seemed to have been moving towards, namely that the incarnation was possible because the divine Son operated 
as the soul of Christ (Daley, 2002: 475). 
11 Apollinarius’ solution, which made the holistic unity of Christ a key selling point, bequeathed the famous 
phrase to the later Nestorian controversy: ‘one enfleshed Word of God’. 
12 Young with Teal (2010: 251). 
13 This passage is taken from Apollinarius’ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΝ ΔΙΟΚΑΙΣΑΡΕΙΑ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΡΟΥΣ 2.256.5-7, in the 
Greek text provided by Lietzmann (1904: 255-56). I have used the translation given by Spoerl (1998: 144n.50).  
14 Apollinarius, Fragment 74; Greek text is 2.222 in Lietzmann (1904), translation from Norris (1980: 109). 
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rational mind (νοῦς), where the Logos takes the place of νοῦς in Christ.15 It is unclear why 
Apollinarius’ anthropology is inconsistent in this way: it might be context dependent,16 or it 
is possible that his anthropology evolved over time,17 as he sought to nuance it more carefully 
in soteriological terms.18 But throughout, Apollinarius’ main point seems to be that in Christ 
it is the divine mind (the Logos) which is dominant, providing supernatural life and 
motivation to the human flesh.19 This allows Apollinarius to develop an ethical/subjective 
soteriology in the trichotomist fragments, whereby ordinary humans are saved by making 
their own intellectual ‘self-assimilation’ (οἰκείοω) of Christ’s divine-human union.20 The 
human mind is usually subject not only to sin, but also to the sinful flesh, which tends to 
dominate; the human mind literally cannot help itself of itself.21 But if ordinary Christians 
submit to Christ intellectually, with his all-powerful divine mind ruling the flesh, then they 
can appropriate/assimilate his divine mind for themselves, argues Apollinarius.22 This 
appropriation takes place through a kind of self-willed and subjective imitation of Christ,23 
where the power of the mind is exerted over the flesh in order to attain Christ’s virtue.24 Like 
Apollinarius’ Christology therefore, his soteriology places a heavy emphasis on mind and 
cognition.  
 
4. The Cappadocian response 
 
There are those today who warm to Apollinarius’ innovations,25 but the church of the time 
judged them to be dangerous failures.26 In this, two of the Cappadocian theologians, Gregory 
of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa, played crucial roles. Both were insistent that Christ 
must have a human soul/mind like us in order to save us. Gregory of Nazianzus’s famous 
maxim says it all:27  
 
                                                 
15 Young with Teal (2010: 249); an exhaustive account is given by Carter (2011).  
16 Young with Teal (2010: 251-2). 
17 As Carter (2011) argues throughout. 
18 Of course, it is also possible that Apollinarius really was inconsistent, a charge levelled at him by his critics 
(e.g. Gregory of Nyssa, who accuses Apollinarius of inconsistency throughout his own Antirrhetikos).  
19 In Carter’s invaluable analysis of the Apollinarian fragments, he explains how Apollinarius does not explore 
soteriological arguments in his dichotomist texts very thoroughly, but the soteriology he does offer there seems 
to be based on the idea that the union of divine and human in Christ offers a model (an example?) of ‘physical 
at-one-ment’ for ordinary humans, conferred symbolically through participation in the Eucharist (Carter, 2011: 
160, 173). The trichotomist texts, on the other hand, offer a more sophisticated intellectual soteriology in 
Carter’s reading, as I explain shortly (Carter, 2011: 159-175).  
20 Carter (2011: 162, 173-5).  
21 Apollinarius, Fragment 76 (‘What was needed was unchangeable Intellect which did not fall under the 
domination of the flesh on account of its weakness of understanding but which adapted the flesh to itself without 
force’; translation from Norris, 1980: 109). 
22 Apollinarius, Fragment 74 (‘The self-moved intellect within us shares in the destruction of sin insofar as it 
assimilates itself to Christ’; translation from Norris, 1980: 109). 
23 Beeley (2008: 289). 
24 Apollinarius, Fragment 80 (‘He [God/mind] gives a share in pure virtue to every mind under his control and 
to all those who become like Christ intellectually’; translation from Carter (2011: 372). 
25 E.g. Moreland and Craig (2003: 608-9). 
26 Apollinarius’ doctrines were condemned at several councils, notably in Rome in 377 and Constantinople in 
381 (Bethune-Baker, 1938: 240; Weinandy, 1985: 27).  
27 Usually cited as Gregory’s definitive answer to the Apollinarian controversy, this maxim had served well in 
previous controversies too (Studer, 1993: 195). 
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That which is not assumed is not healed; but that which is united to his Godhead is also 
saved.28 
 
But Gregory of Nyssa made a similar point: 
 
That which he [Christ] united he assumed into his divinity.29 
 
In other words, if the Logos had not assumed a human soul as well as a human body at the 
incarnation, then our human souls (minds) could not be said to be healed as well as our 
human bodies: Christ must assume the human condition entirely in order for it to be healed 
entirely. The Apollinarian Christ is therefore lacking in more than just a human soul: he is 
lacking in the ability to save humankind, according to the Cappadocian way of thinking.  
 
Highly effective as a critique, it is arguable whether this truly engages with the force of 
Apollinarius’ position.30 The Cappadocian position does, though, allow for the development 
of a more sophisticated soteriology. As Brian Daley puts it: 
 
[The Gregorys’] real objection to Apollinarius’ portrait of Christ in not simply the 
absence there of a human soul; it is, rather, his failure to see in Christ the source and 
type of God’s project of reshaping all of humanity together, and every person 
individually in God’s image, through the inner communication of divine life to a 
complete and normal human being.31  
 
Therefore, according to the Gregorys, the work of salvation is through our humble and lowly 
humanity, in all its particularities and messinesses, not around it or in spite of it, as 
Apollinarius had proposed. This Cappadocian emphasis leads to a powerfully-holistic view of 
salvation, including the soul, although both Gregorys develop the view differently, as I shall 
explain shortly.  
 
But first, to expand upon this point about the perceived failure of Apollinarius’ soteriology, 
since it is relevant for the contemporary debate on the soul. The connection between sin and 
the soul is rarely discussed in the contemporary soul debate, but from a theological 
perspective it is vital to preserve this connection. In short, wherever anthropologically we 
place the soul/mind, whether in a different kind of reality from the flesh or within that same 
reality, we must also find a place for sin. Apollinarius failed, according to the Cappadocians, 
because the possibility of sin was not essential to his anthropology. Apollinarius’ soul-less 
Christ was a being who was more-than-human but was actually less-than-human in 
anthropological terms: he had no means of experiencing sin, nor even of comprehending it 
fully in a truly ‘human’ way. Ordinary Christians might have been able to apprehend the 
mind of Christ intellectually in Apollinarius’ soteriology, but since the mind of Christ itself 
was unable to apprehend sin at first hand, then it was unclear that Christ could apprehend 
ordinary humans, still less help them.  
 
                                                 
28 Gregory of Nazianzus, To Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius (Epistle CI); in Schaff and Wace (1996: 
440). 
29 Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrhetikos, M1252. 
30 For Apollinarius, it is important that Christ does not share our lowly humanity but is beyond us, so that we 
can be taken beyond ourselves; for the Gregorys on the other hand, Christ’s humanity must be the same as ours, 
in order to heal what we are now. 
31 Daley (2002: 478). 
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My own concern to clarify this soteriological point arises because the modern debate on the 
soul has overlooked it so comprehensively. As I believe the Apollinarian controversy 
demonstrates, any theological anthropology must find an effective means of incorporating the 
full breadth of the human condition, especially of sin. Discussions of substance and form 
might be philosophically satisfying but they are theologically insufficient: if the human 
condition needs saving, then we must be clear what it needs saving from. Sin is, of course, as 
elusive a concept to describe as the soul: not simply wrong-doing (however that might be 
defined), the idea of sin in Jewish and Christian traditions encapsulates a formidable array of 
created and cosmic entities and circumstances standing over and against God. If it is unclear 
how best to reduce the idea of the soul/mind to a physicalist description without making it 
vanish altogether, then it is doubly unclear how to reduce the idea of sin to a physicalist 
description, even though sin is still no less real as an experiential concept in the human 
condition. In our concern to put forward a physicalist/monist description of the human 
condition we might deny the immaterial soul, but we are still left with the problem of sin. I 
am not, however, advocating a return to the dualist soul. There are greater subtleties here than 
the question of dualism versus monism, as a close examination of what the two Gregorys 
believed about the soul begins to reveal. 
 
5. The soul in Gregory of Nazianzus 
 
In a highly significant passage, Gregory of Nazianzus draws further attention to the problem 
of sin in the soul debate, again attacking the Apollinarian doctrine of a soul-less Christ:  
 
If…[Christ] assumed a body (σῶμα) but left out the mind (νοῦς), then there is an 
excuse for them who sin with the mind (νοῦς); for the witness of God – according to 
you – has shown the impossibility of healing it…therefore you take away the wall of 
partition (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐξαιρεῖς τὸ μεσότοιχον).32  
 
The human soul/mind is by no means dispensable in Christ according to Gregory, since it 
forms the ‘wall of partition’ between the flesh and the Logos: it is the place where sin, 
conscience (and what we would call consciousness) are to be located in the human condition. 
Removing this ‘wall of partition’ (the human mind/soul) removes the possibility of both sin 
and conscience. Note that the Greek term translated here as ‘wall of partition’ (μεσότοιχον) is 
unusual, but it is particularly meaningful in this context: occurring in just one place in the 
New Testament it is nevertheless prominent, and is richly suggestive for Gregory’s purposes 
(Ephesians 2:14): 
 
For he [Christ] is our peace; he has made both groups one and has torn down the 
dividing wall of partition (τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ), that is, the enmity (τὴν 
ἔχθραν), in his flesh (ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ).33  
                                                 
32 Gregory of Nazianzus, To Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius (Ep.CI); in Schaff and Wace (1996: 441). 
Greek text from Patrologia Graeca 37.188. 
33 This is my own translation, which renders the Greek rather literally in order to expose the ambiguity of the 
final phrase. Muddiman (2001: 130-2), for instance, discusses four possible interpretative/translational options. 
For our purposes two stand out: should the final phrase be translated ‘in his flesh’, placing the enmity (the 
dividing wall) within the person of Christ himself, or is it better translated as ‘by means of his flesh’, referring to 
Christ’s act of atonement on the cross? The fact that in the Ephesians text the dividing wall and ‘the enmity’ 
refer to racial distinctions between Jews and Gentiles suggests that the latter option is preferable, but in the 
context of Gregory’s anthropological discussion of the soul of Christ as the dividing wall, the former option 
might be preferable. 
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Gregory’s image of the removal of the μεσότοιχον is a clear allusion to this biblical passage. 
Note that the intriguing combination of τὸ μεσότοιχον with τοῦ φραγμοῦ in the Ephesians 
text is both difficult to translate and difficult to interpret,34 but it conjures up the sense of a 
permanent and impassable barrier, which is nevertheless torn down by Christ. And herein lies 
the real point of interest in the comparison between Gregory’s letter and the Ephesians text, 
for in the latter it is Christ who attacks the wall of partition, while in the former it is the 
Apollinarian, who does not tear down the wall of partition but makes it vanish altogether. In 
other words, the Apollinarian is an anti-Christ, eradicating the dividing wall of partition (the 
soul/mind), so that Christ no longer has anything to tear down, and therefore has no capacity 
to deal with sin (i.e. Christ has no atoning power). Another way of looking at this is to say 
that the wall of partition is the ‘causal joint’ across which divine action occurs; without it 
there is no possibility of atonement. This is why Gregory says that Apollinarianism provides 
an ‘excuse’ for those who sin with the mind: such sin cannot be atoned for in this system, but 
becomes an inevitable and fixed ‘given’ in human nature.  
 
Gregory’s argument then is that the human soul/mind should not be done away with: it is the 
locus of both sin and salvation, the battle ground on which salvation is to be either won or 
lost. Therefore, the soul cannot be removed without making Christ (and the reality of sin) 
pointless. Gregory’s next piece of correspondence makes the same challenge:  
 
They [the Apollinarians] who take away the Humanity and the Interior Image [the soul 
of Christ] cleanse by their newly-invented mask only our outside, and that which is 
seen…35 
 
Οἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποσκευαζόμενοι, καὶ τὴν ἐντὸς εἰκόνα, τὸ ἐκτὸς ἡμῶν καθαρίζουςι 
μόνον διὰ τοῦ καινοῦ προσωπείου, καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου… 
 
This passage poses an important question for those in the contemporary soul debate (such as 
myself) who support a physicalist/monist thesis: by reducing the mind/soul to the status of 
flesh in Christian anthropology, does the physicalist approach reduce the human condition 
merely to ‘that which is seen’, therefore only allowing for a superficial cleansing of the 
human person, or is the physicalist approach capable of describing the true cleansing of the 
human ‘interior’, most especially the mysterious human consciousness? It would seem that, 
until the contemporary physicalist position develops an account of sin, this question will 
remain open.  
 
Also relevant in Gregory’s soteriology is his famous concept of θέωσις,36 which offers a 
vision of how the Christian is turned, through the saving work of Christ and the sanctifying 
work of the Holy Spirit, into the likeness of Christ. This occurs by means of a dynamic 
movement of growth towards God, which occurs at least in part in the believer’s 
intellectual/epistemic domain of being.37 As Christopher Beeley has pointed out, Gregory 
takes a very high view of doctrinal theology, seeing it as the primary means by which the 
Christian makes her ascent to God.38 Contemplation of the mysteries of God, of Christ and of 
                                                 
34 Muddiman (2001: 127-9). 
35 Gregory of Nazianzus, Against Apollinarius; the Second Letter to Cledonius (Ep.CII); in Schaff and Wace 
(1996: 444). Greek text from Patrologia Graeca 37.197. 
36 Beeley (2008: 117). 
37 Beeley (2008: 118). 
38 Beeley (2008: 148-150). 
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salvation are what enable the upwards journey. And although this is not so dissimilar to 
Apollinarius’ suggestion that the Christian believer can assimilate herself to the mind of 
Christ, yet Christian tradition has judged Gregory’s solution to be far more successful, 
because unlike Apollinarius, Gregory’s Christ has actually taken the human mind to himself 
and healed it, not rejected it as unfit for purpose. In other words, Gregory’s θέωσις offers a 
positive intellectual path towards healing and holiness of the entire human. 
 
6. The soul in Gregory of Nyssa 
 
Gregory of Nyssa developed a related idea of salvation to Gregory of Nazianzus’s θέωσις, 
but known as ἐπέκτασις.39 Similarly transformative through growth, ἐπέκτασις is potentially 
even more promising for the modern soul debate (as I will suggest shortly). Like Gregory of 
Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa was certain that Christ has a human soul,40 and he wrote a 
major (and largely non-polemical) treatise on the subject of the human soul and the afterlife, 
On the Soul and the Resurrection.41 This work is extremely useful in exploring fourth century 
beliefs regarding the soul, and it demonstrates considerable sophistication in those beliefs, 
beliefs which are relevant to the monism/dualism question at the heart of the modern soul 
debate.  
 
On the Soul and the Resurrection is constructed as a kind of Socratic dialogue between 
Gregory and his sister Macrina,42 who, through extended answers to Gregory’s questions and 
doubts, provides much of the wisdom and direction of the piece. We know that the soul 
exists, Gregory tells us (via Macrina), because we know that God exists.43 (S)he explains that 
our bodily senses, like sight, are able to apprehend the ‘almighty wisdom which is visible in 
the universe’, and thereby to know the existence of God. Gregory/Macrina then puts an 
interesting spin on this otherwise-familiar argument from design by extending it to the soul 
and the body. Since the human being is ‘a little world’ in him/herself, when we look to our 
‘inner world’ by means of ‘thought and not of sight’, we find evidence of what is unknown 
there, i.e. the soul, which (like God) ‘eludes the grasp of sense.’ This is clearly a circular 
argument on Gregory/Macrina’s part – we may only apprehend the soul by our own 
rationality (i.e. through the exercise of our rational souls) – but the fact of the argument does 
at least demonstrate that the existence of the soul was by no means being taken for granted, 
even in the fourth century.  
 
Likewise, the relationship of the soul to the body (monism versus dualism) was also a 
debatable matter, as becomes clear slightly further on in Gregory/Macrina’s discussion, 
where (s)he contrasts the soul’s peculiarity and individuality (ἐν ἐξηλλαγμένῃ τε καὶ 
ἰδιαζούσῃ φύσει) with the coarseness of the body which it accompanies (παρὰ τὴν σωματικὴν 
                                                 
39 Ludlow (2007: 127-128). 
40 In Gregory of Nyssa’s major polemical work against Apollinarius, Against Apollinarius (or Antirrhetikos) 
possibly written mid-380s (Daley, 1997: 90), Gregory expresses frequent exasperation that Apollinarius could 
effectively conceive of Jesus as a monstrous ‘beast’ without the single decisive element that would make him 
human, a rational soul. 
41 This was written around 380 CE as the Apollinarian controversy was resolving itself (Barnes, 2003: 48). Also 
of note is On the Making of Humankind, written perhaps shortly after the On the Soul and the Resurrection 
(Barnes, 2003: 50). 
42 Wessel (2010: 378) argues that Gregory deliberately alludes to the model of Socrates’ deathbed dialogue in 
Plato’s Phaedo, in order to present a Christian subversion. 
43 On the Soul and the Resurrection; in Schaff and Wace (1994: 433). 
  10 
παχυμέρειαν).44 At first glance, such a contrast may seem like a basic statement of the 
dualistic soul, comprised of a ‘special thinking substance’ (ἰδιάζον νοητῆς οὐσίας).45 
However, there are subtleties, and this is far from the Cartesian substance dualism that is so 
familiar in the modern soul debate. In fact, a careful reading demonstrates that Gregory’s 
anthropology veers towards a kind of practical monism, since it is sufficiently holistic that he 
sees the human person – body and soul – as one psychosomatic being.46 The soul exists 
inseparably with the body, always closely associated with it:47 body and soul are one whole 
as a human is one whole; the soul comes into being when the body is born, such that the two 
grow and develop together;48 and even after death when the body is dissolved into its 
constituent atoms and scattered far and wide, the soul recognises and remains with each atom, 
being the means by which they are re-assembled at the resurrection of the dead.49 There is 
therefore no sense in which the soul might be separable from material/physical reality, 
although the soul is not reducible to it.50 The upshot is that Gregory/Macrina is not quite a 
physicalist (in the reductive sense), but then neither is (s)he obviously a dualist; (s)he is, at 
any rate, a confirmed holist in both life and death.51 In fact, her/his position is not unlike that 
of ‘non-reductive physicalism’ in today’s soul debate. Significantly, (s)he uses the language 
of the soul in a heavily-metaphorical way, to capture aspects of the spiritual life that are not 
reducible to the physical. For instance, in Gregory/Macrina’s protracted discussion of the 
parable of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31 – a parable which is often cited as evidence 
today that the New Testament can conceive of a disembodied afterlife – the metaphorical 
nature of the parable is stressed by Gregory/Macrina, such that (s)he interprets it as an 
allegory of the moral life during our earthly (present) existence, and of the sins that may 
consequently cling to the soul after death.52 When (s)he concludes this section by speaking of 
the disembodied soul ‘soaring up to the Good’ unhindered by the flesh, it is to make an 
allegorical point about the need to be free from the sins of the flesh in this life so as to avoid a 
‘second death’ at the Judgement.53 This, to my mind, is much more like a practical monism 
than a Cartesian dualism.  
 
The ‘soaring up to the Good’ is reminiscent of Gregory’s famous concept of ἐπέκτασις, 
which appears in a number of his works (especially in his Commentary on Song of Songs), 
and presents his view of the soul in even fuller theological perspective. Hinting at the 
                                                 
44 Greek text from Patrologia Graeca 46.28. This passage is translated (not so accurately) by Schaff and Wace 
(1994: 433) as, ‘And our conception of it [the soul] is this; that it exists, with a rare and peculiar nature of its 
own, independently of the body with its gross texture.’ 
45 Greek text from Patrologia Graeca 46.36; translated in Schaff and Wace (1994: 435). 
46 Norris (1963: 28-29); Behr (1999: 226-30); Boersma (2013: 103).  
47 Hence the famous definition, ‘The soul is an essence created, and living, and intellectual, transmitting from 
itself to an organised and sentient body the power of living and of grasping objects of sense, as long as a natural 
constitution capable of this holds together’ (On the Soul and the Resurrection; in Schaff and Wace, 1994: 433). 
48 A point explored in Gregory’s On the Making of Humankind 28-29 (in Schaff and Wace, 1994: 419-422). See 
also Zachhuber (2000: 160-161), who investigates the relationship between Gregory’s traducianism and 
Apollinarius’s. 
49 On the Soul and the Resurrection; in Schaff and Wace (1994: 437-438, 445-446); The Great Catechism VIII; 
in Schaff and Wace (1994: 483, 489). 
50 Also, the soul/mind has a higher theological status than the body in Gregory’s thought, since it is the soul 
alone that is made in God’s image (Boersma, 2013: 104). 
51 This point is made clear by Macrina’s rejoinder of the example of the water organ against Gregory’s sceptical 
physicalism (On the Soul and the Resurrection; Schaff and Wace, 1994: 435-436). If thought could emerge by 
itself spontaneously from the organic body alone, then it would be like a musical instrument building itself and 
playing itself spontaneously.  
52 On the Soul and the Resurrection; in Schaff and Wace (1994: 447-448). 
53 On the Soul and the Resurrection; in Schaff and Wace (1994: 448-449). 
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‘straining forward’ of Phil.3:13,54 Gregory’s ἐπέκτασις captures the idea of the dynamic 
transformation of the entire believer into the likeness of Christ. This can be related to 
Gregory’s Christology, where Gregory describes the transformation of Jesus’ human nature 
by means of the divine.55 Gregory’s most celebrated image pictures Christ’s human nature 
encountering the divine as like a drop of vinegar mingling with the ocean.56 In an important 
reading of this analogy,57 Brian Daley argues that Gregory sees the humanity of Jesus as no 
longer discernible in any of its own qualities – being so dominated by the divine that it is, to 
all intents and purposes, identical with it58 – yet the humanity continues to exist and to 
undergo further change. Human characteristics such as mortality and disease are swallowed 
up, while the ever-changeability of human nature remains. And since the risen Christ is the 
‘first fruits’ of the transformed humanity, Daley argues that every believer can therefore be 
caught up into the same process of eternal transformation.59  
 
Daley’s reading of Gregory’s Christology parallels Gregory’s ἐπέκτασις, especially in the 
sense of eternal transformation within ἐπέκτασις. For eternal it truly is: in Morwenna 
Ludlow’s exploration of the ἐπέκτασις motif it is to be seen not as a period of change which 
reaches its final state of perfection at the Eschaton; rather, it is humankind’s eschatological 
state.60 There is no state of blessed stasis and perfection to be attained one glorious day: 
instead, the process of eternally change into perfection is what is destined for humans for all 
eternity. Since Christians hope for resurrection one day – a resurrection like that of Christ – 
the complete human condition will be caught up into this: flesh and body as well as mind and 
soul, and also our complex networks of human relationships.61 Gregory thus offers a holistic 
view of the human condition, capturing body, mind and soul in community, and all in 
contemplation of the divine. And significantly, ἐπέκτασις operates in this life too, through the 
soul/mind’s cognitive trajectory of ascent into the mysteries of God.  
 
Therefore, if the modern soul debate is inclined to pigeonhole the soul into either 
Platonic/Cartesian (an eternal and unchangeable substance distinct from the body) or 
Aristotelian (the form of the body) terms, then we miss the force of Gregory’s conception. 
The soul is on a different plane from the body – an epistemological plane – but its 
changeability and its inextricable links with the body are integral to the soul’s identity as part 
of the entire process of human straining forward. For Gregory, the entire human person, 
including our rational soul and intellect, is subject to change and transformation, and that is 
precisely how humans are saved by Christ. And therefore, as Ludlow points out,62 Gregory’s 
soteriology links human ontology – our state of being – with epistemology – our state of 
knowing. Rather like Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa believes that theology – and 
the doing of it – is transformative and soteriological.63 The doing of theology may be a never-
                                                 
54 ‘Beloved, I do not consider that I have made it my own; but this one thing I do: forgetting what lies behind 
and straining forward (ἐπεκτεινόμενος) to what lies ahead’. 
55 Gregory’s Christology is not without its conceptual problems: scholars have variously found Gregory 
puzzling, and difficult to categorise within the scholarly pigeonholes of the period (Ludlow, 2007: 98-104). 
Nevertheless, Daley makes a strong argument for taking Gregory on his own terms (Daley, 1997: 88).  
56 Antirrheticus 42, and Against Eunomius III.3 (or V.5 in the edition translated by Schaff and Wace, 1994: 
181). See Ludlow (2006:99) and Daley (1997: 87) for further details concerning this analogy. Widely cited, the 
drop of vinegar analogy is not without its problems of interpretation either (Ludlow, 2007: 99-106). 
57 Daley (1997; 2002). 
58 Daley (2002: 483). 
59 Daley (1997: 94). 
60 Ludlow (2007: 131-132). 
61 Ludlow (2007: 126, 130). 
62 Ludlow (2007: 271-275). 
63 Needless to say, this is good news for those of us who do theology for a living. 
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ending task (an uphill struggle perhaps), but that is a good thing, not bad, since it is 
fundamentally the desire of the human mind/soul to grow and to know and to love God more 
deeply.64 Gregory’s language may at times appear to envision a disembodied soul, especially 
when he speaks of the soul’s ascent towards God, but it is an apophatic metaphor intended to 
capture the intellectual ascent of the soul/mind, as well as the soul/mind’s ‘reaching-out to 
God in love’, in this life as much as the next.65 In the Hebrew Bible, the word שֶׁפ ֶֶ֫נ 
(habitually translated ‘soul’ in English) frequently appears in contexts which refer to the 
whole person’s drives (including for food and water, e.g. Ps.107:9; Prov.25:25), desires, and 
yearnings, which may be spiritual (e.g. Ps.42; 130:6), or even sexual (e.g. Song 3). ‘Soul’ is 
therefore an ideal term to use when speaking scripturally of the mind in its mode of 
contemplation and adoration: it is the whole human life in active search of God. It is no 
accident that some of Gregory’s most intense ἐπέκτασις language concerning the soul is to be 
found in his Commentary on the Song of Songs, reflecting on this biblical text’s deep 
undercurrents of eroticism and desire for full personal realisation through seeking after the 
other in love. To read this language in polarised terms (embodied versus disembodied, 
dualistic versus monistic) is to miss the theological force and beauty of Gregory’s vision.  
 
This last point is particularly valuable in light of our present tendency to over-literalise talk of 
the soul. If we wish to understand the soul and how it coheres with the body, we simply 
cannot, suggests Gregory in The Great Catechism: the soul is inextricably mysterious, like 
the union between God and human in Christ, or like the making of the original creation.66 The 
causal joints between body and mind, creation and Creator are beyond our understanding, he 
appears to suggest; nevertheless, those causal joints must be there.  
 
7. Application to the modern soul debate 
 
The various stances on the soul adopted by these three figures from the fourth century CE – 
Apollinarius of Laodicea, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa – are subtle and 
complex, and I have only sketched their thinking in outline here. There are parallels with the 
modern discussion on the soul, but since the modern discussion is fixated with issues of 
substance and form, and dualism versus monism, these fourth century thinkers offer many 
contrasts and riches that our current debate completely overlooks. In short, all three thinkers 
see the soul – the rational mind – as the soteriological bridge between ontology and 
epistemology. And for the Cappadocians the soul must be affirmed ontologically precisely 
because it is the theatre of knowing, especially the knowing of Christ, the goal of any 
Christian. At the same time the soul is the theatre of opposition to knowing Christ: the 
dividing wall, the location of sin, that theological concept which is as elusive as the soul is 
elusive.  
 
By synthesising my presentation of these three thinkers, I should like to offer seven 
considerations for the current soul debate, considerations which (I believe) the debate has not 
yet reflected upon, but which emerge from the Apollinarian controversy as being of prime 
soteriological importance: 
 
1. The existence and nature of the human soul was a matter of debate in the fourth 
century, as it is in ours. Full-blown physicalism was a viable option, as the dialogue 
                                                 
64 Ludlow (2007: 291). 
65 Ludlow (2007: 231). 
66 Great Catechism XI; in Schaff and Wace (1994: 486). 
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between Gregory of Nyssa and Macrina makes clear. However, there was a concern to 
avoid reductionism: the two Gregorys appeared to feel that the reality of the human 
soul as something ‘extra’ must be affirmed, because pure physicalism alone was 
simply too reductive in theological terms.  
2. As Apollinarius realised, the human mind/soul is a necessary soteriological 
battleground: it is the prime locus of sin in the human condition. And as the Gregorys 
realised, doing away with Christ’s human soul means that sin can no longer be 
defeated: Christ must be epistemically open to sin in order to deal with it 
ontologically. In other words, Christ cannot save humans by losing his mind, and he 
cannot defeat it in the flesh alone. The point is that sin cannot be reduced to the flesh, 
but Christ must save our thoughts too. 
3. Transferring this to the modern debate, the reality of human consciousness as a 
theological arena in its own right distinct from the flesh needs to be affirmed in order 
to capture the significance of sin. As Gregory of Nazianzus reminds us, the soul is the 
‘wall of partition’ between the flesh and the divine, the place where Christ does his 
work, and where spiritual transformation is focussed. It is, in short, the ‘causal joint’ 
through which the divine work of soteriology takes place. To deny the soul (in this 
context) is to deny the causal joint and to embrace a deistic deity who is powerless to 
save. 
4. In other words, a reductionist position that puts too much emphasis on the physicality 
of the human condition alone cannot capture the full significance of sin nor of 
Christian soteriology, both of which are theological entities not easily reducible to the 
physical.  
5. This does not necessarily mean that the only solution is to affirm a fully-dualist 
disembodied soul. Gregory of Nyssa, for one, seems to have operated within a 
position somewhere between what we might call monism and dualism. It was, in any 
case, fully holistic in both life and death.  
6. In fact, none of the three thinkers was a strict dualist, and all attempted to describe a 
holistic anthropology of some kind. None of them conceived of the soul as a kind of 
detachable ‘mini me’, but as me in the mode of rationality: changeable, finite, but 
striving always to grow towards the light. In all three thinkers talk of the soul was the 
epistemological bridge to knowing, loving (and of course rejecting) God. 
7. Therefore, our modern talk of the soul must grasp the fact that it is not only possible 
but necessary to speak in mystical and metaphorical terms of disembodiment while 
holding on to a monist-like and holistic position. This is essentially Gregory of 
Nyssa’s vision of ἐπέκτασις. To interpret this literally as though speaking of the 
dualistic disembodied soul is to misunderstand it altogether, and to fail to recognise 
that there are large areas of Christian mystical and soteriological thought where our 
modern scientific desire for precision in material/physical terms is completely 
ineffective. In short, the modern soul debate must be careful not to miss the point.  
 
In light of these seven considerations, I believe it is clear that the modern soul debate needs to 
move beyond its preoccupations with substance versus form, and reductionism versus 
emergentism. It is not that these issues are irrelevant, but that they have been allowed to 
control the debate to such a degree that the real value of ‘soul language’ – namely its ability 
to capture soteriological and mystical categories in a concise way – has been lost to sight. In 
short, talk of the soul has been over-literalised to the extent that the only question that is seen 
to matter is whether it is a ‘thing’ that exists or not. If we must speculate on the soul as a 
‘thing’, then I suggest that the above seven considerations are not incompatible with an 
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approximately physicalist position, and this would be my own preferred solution.67 But the 
overriding point of my argument is that a view of the soul must be developed which considers 
theological entities of primary importance (such as sin and salvation), and which engages 
meaningfully with mystical ideas such as deification. Ray Anderson, working within the 
perspective of non-reductive physicalism, has already pointed out (albeit very briefly) the 
holistic nature of the body/soul unity in the biblical perspective, and how this picture 
incorporates the effects of sin, producing disorder at physical, social, psychological and 
spiritual levels.68 My response is that, while we would certainly want to acknowledge the 
psychosomatic (and other tangible/visible) effects of sin, this cannot be the only level at 
which sin is acknowledged in the human condition, or else we will fall into the 
fatalistic/deterministic trap of asking all over again, ‘Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his 
parents, that he was born blind?’ (John 9:2). Rather, the soul as ‘dividing wall’ and causal 
joint needs to be more the focus of attention than it is at present, without tying it down 
futilely to some modern-day equivalent of Descartes’ pineal gland. 
 
8. Summary 
 
The fourth century Apollinarian controversy – which concerned the question of whether Jesus 
has a human rational soul/mind or not – emphasises theological categories that have been lost 
to sight in the contemporary soul debate, namely the place of sin in the human mind, the 
soteriological role of Christ which connects epistemic and ontological categories, and 
mystical talk of deification (‘the ascent of the soul’). I have proposed that it is not necessary 
to adopt a full-blown dualist perspective in order to explore these ideas, since the original 
thinkers did not do so. Rather, I have suggested ways in which these ideas need to be 
explored within the context of physicalism as a starting point, in order to develop the 
contemporary monistic paradigm further.  
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